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Formalization and Quantification in Historical Analysis *)
Charles Tilly
A Wave or Formalization
In historical analysis, the first great wave of formalization started in the
1950s and began to lose its force in the 1970s. Now it has spent itself. When and
how will the second wave arrive, if it ever does? Let us address the question in
characteristic historical fashion: by examining the first wave carefully, to see if
it displays regularities that help specify the conditions under which something
similar might occur again.
Formalization? I mean a variety of procedures that match descriptions of e-
vents, structures, and process with exphcit modeis ofthose events, structures, and
processes. Formal methods do not necessarily involve quantification or Compu¬
ting; analyses of linguistic, spatial, or temporal structure, for example, often pro-
ceed quite formally without Computers and without any direct Intervention of
mathematics. In history, however, the formalization that concemed history's
technical Innovators in the 1960s and 1970s typically included quantification
and/or Computing.
Among historians as a group formalization gained a number of energetic
advocates during the 1960s. To some, the increasing availability of formal
procedures for the investigation of large numbers of cases opened the way to
science and certainty. A kind of populism attracted others; they saw the possi-
bility of letting inarticulate people speak for themselves through the real beha¬
vior reflected in parish registers, arrest lists, and similar sources. In either case,
the path toward formalization typically led through collective biography: the
assembly of standardized descriptions of individual units-persons, households,
firms, places, events, points in time, or something else-into portraits of the
entire sets, and into means for studying Variation among the individual units.
Full-fledged formalization in history involves four activities: conceptualiza-
tion, measurement, modeling, and estimation. Conceptualization concerns
the Statement of an historical question as a problem susceptible of formal treat-
ment--for example, conceiving of a plantation as a kind of firm (and thus sui¬
table for analysis in terms of the economics of the firm) or of a Community
as a closed population (and thus available to the demographic analysis of ferti¬
lity change in closed populations). Measurement refers to organizing the evi¬
dence in Standard, comparable form, for example by assembling similar records
*) This paper is a substantially revised version of "Neat Analyses of Untidy Processes."
Working Paper No. 5, Center for Studies of Social Changes, New School for Social Research,
which appeared in International Labor and Working Class History 27 (1985): 4 - 34. The
earher version has a larger bibliography and a more extended discussion of labor history,
but says less about other historical fields.
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of income and expenditure for all households in a village. Modeling involves
the formal Statement of an argument conceming the expected pattern ofa phe¬
nomenon, for example the exphcit retrodiction that in a given German town
more of the Mittelstand than of other classes will turn out to have supported
Hitler. Estimation, finally, means matching model to evidence in order to see
how well the model fits, for example by means of a Statistical procedure, the
correlation coefficient, that determines how close to linear is the relationship
between wage levels and class voting.
All formalization requires some version of conceptualization, measurement,
modeling, and estimation, but analysts do not necessarily give them equal at¬
tention. Formalizing historians have, in fact, devoted little of their ingenuity
to conceptualization, modeling, and estimation. Often they have unwittingly
accepted the concepts, modeis, and estimation procedures that are implicit
in a particular quantitative routine, for example by running a straightforward
ordinary least Squares multiple regression of electoral results on social charac¬
teristics of the populations of electoral districts-an act assuming implicitly that
the electoral districts are coherent, independent units, that the social charac¬
teristics of those units somehow cause the votes of their electorates, that strong
causality would show up as a linear increase or decrease of one sort of vote as
a function of increase or decrease of a particular social characteristic, and so on.
Often historians have truncated their formalizations: taken considerable care
with measurement, only to interpret the measurements informally, for instance
by constructing a time series of strike activity and then inserting it into a non¬
quantitative discussion of rising or falling class consciousness. Historians have,
on the other hand, made great contributions to measurement; they have, for
example, devised ways of reworking religious records into solid indicators of
fertihty, mortality, and nuptiality; research done on the resulting historical
evidence has altered our ideas of the conditions for large-scale population
change.
Formalization had important successes in historical research. Without formal
analysis based on collective biography, we would lack almost all of historical
demography, most city-by-city studies of social mobility, major treatments of
political activism, and much more. Demographic, social, urban, and economic
history all underwent significant renewals through the introduction of formal
analysis and collective biography. That many wheels spun idly and that the
ratio of results achieved to effort expended was often painfully low goes almost
without saying; such things usually happen when unprepared people start ex-
perimenting with complex new techniques and equipment. On balance, never-
theless, the introduction of formal procedures enriched the possibilities of his¬
torical analysis.
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Despite indignant complaints about the irruption of positivism into history,
many historians then feit that formalization and quantification were the wave of
the future. Jacob Price and Val Lorwin-no wild-eyed enthusiasts-introduced
their volume on quantitative history with the declaration that:
From France to Scandinavia to Japan, quantitative ways of thinking, quanti¬
tative approaches, and quantitative methods have entered the mainstream
of historical investigation. In all areas, major quantitative work is now being
done, and even more is Hkely to be done in the immediate future. The neglect
of the possibilities of quantitative research by so many American historians
working on topics outside of United States history leds to an unnecessary
restriction of their analytical techniques and an unfortunate enfeeblement
of their results. Not all problems are equally suitable for quantification; nor
will quantification ever become the exclusive or even preponderant form or
mood of historical investigation. Yet if historians in the United States and
other English-speaking lands working on the history of other countries wish
to move to exciting frontiers of research endeavor in their respective areas
of interest, a greater proportion of them than at present will have to think
and work in part quantitatively 1).
Lorwin and Price's Statement, although restrained and sensible in its context,
rings quaintly today. "Existing frontier of research endeavor" ? In economic,
demographic, and electoral history, quantification has ceased being an adventure
in itself; historians in those specialties quantify as a matter of course. Almost
everywhere eise, however, quantitative analysis has lost much of its following.
It is now fashionable to decry formal methods as sterile and reductionist, to in-
sist on the centrality of consciousness, mentalities, and culture in historical
experience, and therefore to regard textual explication, retrospective ethnogra-
phy, and the construction of intelligible narratives conceming daily experience
as history's true frontier. As Erik Monkkonen, an experienced quantifier, re¬
ports:
From scholarly Journals to the New York Times, historians have been
castigating themselves for excessive narrowness and a decline in the public
voice of their profession. This critique has been articulated through a call
for a return to "the narrative", which seems to mean well told, dramatic
stories of the past, which attract large readerships, public attention, and
respect. Indirectly, quantitative history has born the brunt of this critique,
though it includes many non-quantitative forms of history as well 2).
The new critique has an ironic side. It arrives more or less in step with the
long-awaited appearance of major works of quantitative social history such as
1) Val R. Lorwin and Jacob M. Price, eds,, The Dimensions of the Past: Mate¬
rials, Problems, Opportunities for Quantitative Work in History (New Haven, 1972) 10,
2) Eric Monkkonen, "The Challenge of Quantitative History," Historical Methods
17 (1984): 86-94.
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Wrigley and Schofield's Population History ofEngland and the Stones' An Open
Elite? 3). But since Lawrence Stone himself has lent an influential voice to the
critique, it represents more than a discordant noise in the profession, at least in
the Anglo-Saxon world 4). In contrast, Continental Europe looks different.
There, formal analysis are still proliferating: studies of Nazi membership, enume-
rations of Swiss Aktivierungsereignisse, content analyses of Medieval texts, and
much more. There, furthermore, even studies concentrating on qualitative
variations and states of mind commonly turn to some sort of formalization
as an auxiliary to their analyses. Daniel Roche's treatment of eighteenth-century
provincial academies, for instance, deals mainly with the Organization and cultu¬
re of those quintessential Enlightenment institutions,\yet Roche does not hesi-
tate to map, graph, or quantify the provincial savants' activity: not only such
obvious features as social origin and age at death, but also more esoteric matters
such as themes of pöetry read and contents of appointment letters 5). Conti¬
nental institutional, cultural, and intellectual historians often turn to formal
methods of analysis.
To some extent, the difference between Anglo-Saxon and Continental Euro¬
pean reliance on quantification reflects differences in the questions being asked.
Generally speaking, quantification provides Httle help in attempts to account
for single instances of anything, especially if the explanations being considered
rest on general traits of the individual, group, or place in question. Quantifica¬
tion becomes more useful as a function of a) the compexity of the explanatory
model, b) the intrinsic quantifiability of the phenomenon to be explained, c)
the importance of Variation to the argument, and d) the number of units obser¬
ved. Any form of "exceptionalism" tends to make quantification uninteresting,
even distasteful. Thus the greater readiness of continental scholars to place
their subjects in a comparative frame, and yet to employ complex arguments,
inclines them toward quantification.
Clearly, the post-1950 wave of formalization did not strike all parts of the
historical shore with equal force. At one extreme, such specialties as economic
and demographic history made formal methods their Standard procedures. At
the other, fields such as intellectual history, diplomatic history, and the history
of science remained almost untouched by formalization. In between, political
history, urban history, social history, labor history, and related subdisciplines
3) E. A. Wrigley and R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England,
1541 - 1871: A Reconstruction (London, 1981); Lawrence Stone and Jeanne Fawtier
Stone, An open Elite? England 1540 - 1800 (Oxford, 1984).
4) Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History,"
Past and Present 85 (1979): 3-24.
5) Daniel Roche, Le siede des Lumidres en province: Academies et acadfe'miciens
provinciaux, 1680 - 1789 (Paris, 1978), 2 vols.
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divided by specific subject; the study of social mobility, industrial conflict,
urban segregation patterns, elections, and household structure became quite
formal, for instance, while students of power structure, war, revolution, gen¬
der, urban planning, and social movements rarely ventured into formal analy¬
sis of their evidence. Within these intermediate fields, methodological struggles,
line-drawing, mutual suspicion, and name-calling multiplied.
Disciplinary Agendas
Although these struggles entailed plenty of misunderstanding, they did not
result from simple ignorance. Disciplinary agendas were at stake. In any disci-
pline, members organize themselves in two fundamental ways: a) by creating a
bounded interpersonal network, often one that is formalized via organizations,
meetings, Journals, and similar devices; b) by establishing a shared agenda which
includes pressing questions, certified means of answering those questions, and a
recognized body of relevant evidence.
Let us concentrate on the pressing questions. All historical fields having any
practical coherence organize around a very limited number of "payoff questi-
ons"--questions which define the field, whose pursuit requires little or no justi-
fication among practitioners, with respect to which specialists are instantly
alert to new answers, confirmations of disputed answers, or challenges towide-
ly accepted answers. At any given moment, only a limited number of alternati¬
ve answers to the big questions are typically in play; otherwise, members of the
craft worry about its disarray.
Labor history provides a case in point. Labor history is a bipolar field. It ac¬
tually organizes around two partly independent sets of questions. One set sums
up to the very broad query: What relationships exist among the Organization of
production, the formation of social classes, and workers' collective action?
Under that broad rubric fall narrower and somewhat more manageable questions
such as "Which kinds of workers, in what circumstances, most regularly engage
in class-conscious militancy, and why?" That and perhaps a dozen other ques¬
tions inform the bulk of research and writing in labor history.
The other cluster of questions cumulates to this one: What historical circum¬
stances determine the rise and fall of militant and/or effective national labor
movements? This question, unanswerable as stated, breaks into a small series
of less general inquiries. Within labor-history-defined-as-national-movements, one
of the few venerable payoff questions is "Why so much more socialism in some
countries and periods than others?" Broadly speaking, the main alternative ans¬
wers to that old query now under serious consideration are variants of the fol¬
lowing:
1. The Organization of capitalist production varies significantly over time and
Space, and only some (few) versions of it promote sharp confrontations of labor
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and capital; those confrontations produce support for socialist programs.
2. The pohtical strategies of states and national elites—for example, cooptation
and corporatism-strongly affect the availability and viability of a socialist reply
to capitalist power.
3. Other features of social life, such as the presence of ethnic divisions, the dif-
fusion of bourgeois styles of life, or the structure of workers' residential commu¬
nities, govern the extent of working-class consciousness, and therefore the sup¬
port for socialism.
4. Specific historical experiences and leaders, such as responses to the Depres¬
sion of the 1930s, shape the political choices and possibilities available within
any particular State.
Put so generally, to be sure, these answers could all be correct simultaneously.
Only when a historian specifies one of the Statements further (for example, by
claiming that American geographic and class mobility diminished working-class
consciousness) or assigns preeminence to one of them (for example, by insisting
that working-class socialism appears only in early phases of rapid industrializa-
tion) do sharp contradictions arise. But historians, including labor historians,
proceed by alternation between the deliberate sharpening of such contradictions
and the judicious synthesis of competing arguments. The choices, and the balan-
ce among the choices, remain fundamental to their work. At a given point in
time, only a handful of such questions define the overall agenda of the entire
field,
Labor history has an indefinite boundary, a chaotic periphery, and a relati¬
vely well-defined core. Labor historians regard historical research and writing
as important to the extent that it a) renews understanding of the conditions
underlying national fluctuations in the militancy and/or effectiveness of worker
action, b) helps connect the Organization of production, the formation of social
classes, and worker collective action, or c) both. By and large, the successes
of formal analysis have occurred in labor history's periphery. They inciude:
a) time-series; analyses of the determinants of fluctuations in national levels
of strike activity,
b) treatments of the organizational bases of workers' collective action,
c) studies of the demographic correlates of different sorts of industrial Organi¬
zation
d) reconstructions of labor migration and its consequences,
e) quantitative portrayals of occupational mobility and of social ties among
different occupations, and
f) research on the urban geography of migration, work, and workers.
These sorts of studies have great merits. (At least I hope so, since my own
efforts in labor history lie almost entirely in these areas). But they do not address
the organizing questions of labor history directly.
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The organizing questions, on the other hand, resist formalization. Remember
the ideal conditions for useful quantification: 1) an explicit, complex model of
the process or structure under analysis, 2) intrinsic quantifiability of the pheno-
men to be explained, 3) importance of Variation to the central arguments, 4)
large number of units. Although the major modeis of labor history are often
complex, they are rarely explicit. Many of the major phenomena figuring in
those modeis, such as class consciousness and revolutionary will, are not ob¬
viously quantifiable. Variation is a sometime visitor to the central arguments
of labor history; although the differences between two countries are often at
issue, even that minimum comparison serves mainly to identify the unique
properties of each individual country. And the central arguments of labor histo¬
ry rarely deal explicitly with large numbers of units, except in the sense that
they sum up the experience of all workers, all labor unions, and so on.
Where Formalization Works
Many other historical fields resemble labor history in these regards. Intellec¬
tual history, the history of science, diplomatic history, political history, the his¬
tory of warfare, and most synthetic national histories (e. g. the histories of India
or China) rarely employ explicit modeis, deal with intrinsically quantifiable
phenomena, analyze Variation systematically, or treat large numbers of units-
at least not all at the same time. And these characteristics stem directly from a
concentration on payoff questions that resist formalization.
Within labor history, consider the problem of national labor movements. For¬
mal analyses of strike activity and quantitative treatments of the organizational
bases of workers' collective action begin to address that issue. Yet labor histori¬
ans tend to question their validity and relevance on the grounds that the formal
analyses in question consider too narrow a ränge of action, fail to provide con-
vincing evidence on the orientations of the workers involved, and ignore the poh¬
tical context.
When push comes to shove, labor historians who are concemed with national
labor movements seem to want one or both of two things: a) persuasive recon-
stitutions of the shared states of mind of the principal actors at different points
in time, b) tactical replays of the interactions among various groups of workers,
labor leaders, capitalists, political powerholders, State officials, and other signi¬
ficant actors in the national arena. Formal studies of strike activity and of the
organizational bases of worker collective action set some limits on the possible
reconstitutions of shared states of mind, but provide no effective means for
getting at them directly. Dealing with strikes in nineteenth-century Massachu¬
setts, for instance, Carol Conell is able to build mathematical modeis whose
empirical application strongly suggests an important conclusion: skilled workers
timed and located both their Organization and their strike activity to maxi-
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mize the impact of withholding their labor, and the advantage of Organization
and timing to them was significantly greater than it was for less skilled workers.
But Conell's results cannot teil us whether skilled workers made self-conscious
calculations to that effect 6).
On the side of strategy and tactics, in principle, it is possible to capture tacti-
cal interplay in formal modeis; in practice, the difficulties of measurement and
modeling entailed by the analysis of fluctuations in the national politics of labor
will exceed anyone's technical capacity for some time to come. Instead, labor
historians are likely to continue with analytically-informed narratives and broad,
complex comparisons of a few national experiences at a time. Neither of these
enterprises will yield readily to formalization.
Or take the other core problem: the connections among the Organization of
production, class formation, and worker collective action. Several of the formali¬
zed analyses in my earlier list obviously touch on the problem: studies of organi¬
zational bases of worker collective action, labor migration, and social mobility.
Yet labor historians tend to insist on the consciousness and experience contai-
ned in class formation, and the political interaction affecting worker collective
action. They also tend to broaden "class formation" and "worker collective
action" to embrace a wide ränge of behavior. In those circumstances, the exis¬
ting formalizations become peripheral to the real enterprise, and the formaliza-
tions that are possible in principle become enormously demanding.
Common understandings of labor history's core focus on matters that yield
only with great difficulty to formal analysis. Class consciousness is the obvious,
and no doubt the most important, example. But recentiy different varieties of
culture have preempted the territory previously occupied by class consciousness.
If the current drift toward retrospective ethnography, individual experience, and
discourse continues, formalization will spread slowly, remain at its present low
level, or even decline in significance.
Nevertheless, the periphery constrains the core. Collective biography, as the
central evidence-producing procedure of formal analysis, necessarily sets limits
on a wide variety of arguments in labor history. Findings of studies dealing with
labor migration, industrial conflict, daily life and other "peripheral" subjects
set limits on plausible reconstructions of the connections among production,
class formation, and collective action, or on explanations of fluctuations in
national labor militancy and effectiveness. Studies by Victoria Bonneil, Diane
Koenker, William Rosenberg, and others conceming the Organization and action
of workers in Moscow and Petrograd, for example, now make it virtually impos¬
sible to portray working-class involvement in twentieth-century Russian move¬
ments as a consequence of the thrusting of uprooted peasants into big-city indus¬
trial life7).
6) Carol C o n e 1 1, 'The Impact of Union Sponsorship on Strikes in Nineteenth Cen¬
tury Massachusetts," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1980.
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Again, research on the dynamics of rural industry by Franklin Mendels, David
Levine, Yves Lequin, and others has established the wide extent of rural prole-
tarianization-and therefore of a kind of class formation-in Europe before the
period of capital-concentrated industrialization, the complex interdependence
between proletarianization and population growth, and the importance of re¬
gional Systems linking the labor and capital of city and country. These findings
limit our possible accounts of the qualitative experience of industrialization.
They thereby make more dubious the oncepopular explanations of working-class
action that stressed the shock of abrupt-exposure to industrial conditions 8).
Over the last two decades, important findings on such matters have emerged
firom formal analysis, and would have been less likely to appear without formal
analysis.
Conditions for Change
Formalization, then, does have a bearing on the core questions of labor histo¬
ry. Under what circumstances might we expect formal analyses to become every¬
day activities of labor historians, as they have for economic, demographic, and
urban historians? Three possibilities come to mind: 1) that some group of scho¬
lars who are directly addressing labor history's core questions will develop a
kind of formalization that will transform the field: 2) that the core will shift to
questions that now remain in the periphery, and for which effective formal
procedures exist; 3) that an intellectual revolution will establish a new core that
lends itself directly to formal analyses. None of the three is likely.
It is possible, but improbable, that some great success will establish formal ana¬
lysis at the core of labor history. American urban history once concentrated on
urban biographies and general portrayals of urbanization, It shifted rapidly
toward some kinds of quantitative work when Stephan Thernstrom and a few
other pioneers demonstrated that through a variety of collective biography ur¬
ban history could produce results bearing on one of American history's grandest
questions: to what extent is the United States a land of opportunity, and how
much has that opportunity changed over time 9)? In retrospect, one can see
7) Victoria B o n n e 1 1, Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organization in St.
Petersburg and Moscow, 1900 - 1914 (Berkeley, 1983); Diane K o e n k e r, Moscow
Workers and the 1917 Revolution (Princeton, 1981); and William G. Rosenberg,
"Workers and Workers' Control in the Russian Revolution", History Workshop Journal,
5 (1978): 89-97.
8) Franklin Mendels, "Seasons and Regions in Agriculture and Industry during
the Process of Industrialization," in: Sidney P o 1 1 a r d, ed., Region und Industrialisie¬
rung: Studien zur Rolle der Region in der Wirtschaftsgeschichte der letzten zwei Jahr¬
hunderte (Göttingen, 1980); David Levine, ed., Proletarization and Family Life
(Orlando, Fl, 1984); and Yves Lequin, Les ouvriers de la region lyonnaise, 1848
-
1914 (Lyon, 1977), 2 vols.
9) Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth
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readily that the question has a quantitative, structural component that lends
itself to formal treatment. In prospect,however, it is not so easy to see that ei¬
ther of the dominant agendas of labor history-the one linking production, class
formation, and working-class action or the one dealing with national labor move-
ments-wül yield to formal treatments that most labor historians will recognize
as contributions to their field.
It is possible, but even less probable, that the periphery will transform the
core-that because of the transformation of our understanding of labor history
through work on such matters as labor migration, gender, or industrial conflict
the Standard questions conceming national labor movements or the established
triad of production, consciousness, and collective action will come to seem less
central to the entire enterprise. To some extent, such shifts have occurred in
economic and social history; peripheral questions (such as how, if at all, indus¬
trialization transformed social relations within families) became core questions.
The creation of an entirely new core is unlikely and unpredictable. If it occurs
at all, changes in the political environments of scholars concemed with labor-
the success of a certain kind of revolution, the failure of another, a fundamental
shift in the positions of workers and organized labor-will surely play a part in
the redefinition of labor history's subject matter. In that unpredictable event,
the discipline's organizing questions could move toward problems that lend
themselves to formal analysis. They could also, however, emphasize problems
that are even less amenable to formalization. This possibility therefore leads to
no forecast at all.
Let me add a disclaimer. I do not claim that a shift to formalization, or to the
sorts of peripheral questions that lend themselves to formalization, would "im¬
prove" or even "clarify" labor history. I do claim that in the present Organiza¬
tion of the field a great expansion of formal analysis at its core is very, very un¬
likely. Not unless the organizing questions of labor history change significantly
will Computing, quantification, and other formalizations become central to the
discipline. To the extent that members of the discipline move toward questions
involving explicit modeis, systematic Variation, comparison of many cases, and
intrinsically quantitative phenomena, conversely, they will become receptive to
formalization.
The same reasoning applies, I believe, to the rest of history. In pohtical histo¬
ry, diplomatic history, intellectual history, and a number of other fields, no
large expansion of formalization will occur unless the dominant questions chan¬
ge. In any of the fields someone could devise a formal method that would recast
a major question, currently peripheral questions that lend themselves to forma¬
lization could become more pressing, or an intellectual revolution that replaced
Century City (Cambridge, 1964); and "The New Urban History," in: Charles F. D e 1 z e 1
ed., The Future as History (Nashville, 1977).
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the core questions could occur. As the use of Computers for such routine tasks
as the preparation and storage of texts increases, historians might find themsel¬
ves drifting into the pursuit of questions that only Computers make practicable.
As the findings ofthose fields that have invested heavily in formalization, such
as economic history, impinge on the questions people are asking in other fields
(for example, by stretching out the ''industrial revolution" over such a long peri¬
od that it stops being a plausible explanation of abrupt changes in populär
politics), historians in unformalized fields may find themselves compelled to for-
malize, if only to drive away the formalizers.
No doubt we can invent other scenarios that would produce a rapid, large in¬
crease in historical formalization. Nevertheless, the main points remain: in to-
day's practice of history, with few exceptions, the dominant questions around
which practitioners organize resist formal analysis; those questions guide a great
deal of research and change rather slowly. Without a substantial alteration of
those questions we have no reason to expect a rapid expansion of formalization.
